

# Almost Public Quantum Coins

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- Construction
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# INTRODUCTION



# UNFORGEABLE MONEY

- Can money schemes be unforgeable?

- Classically not possible.

- With quantum, you can!

Can be  
cloned!

01010111	01101001	01101011
01101001	01110000	01100101
01100100	01101001	01100001

# QUANTUM MONEY

*(Keygen, Mint, Verify)*



$sk \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(1^\lambda)$

$\text{Mint}(sk) \rightarrow |\$ \rangle$




$\text{Verify}(|\tilde{\$} \rangle) \rightarrow \text{Accept/Reject}$

$|\tilde{\$} \rangle$



# PRIVATE VS PUBLIC QUANTUM MONEY

## Private Quantum Money



## Public Quantum Money



# COINS VS BILLS



Indistinguishable copies

How does it matter? **Privacy!**

Unique serial numbers



Serial numbers can be tracked.



# PREVIOUS WORKS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS





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# QUANTUM MONEY CONSTRUCTIONS

- **Private Quantum Money:** Wiesner's money, Gavinsky's quantum money scheme, etc.
- **Public Quantum Money:** Zhandry's quantum money, Farhi et al.

No public money construction based on weak and generic assumptions.

# QUANTUM COINS CONSTRUCTIONS

Private Quantum coin Scheme	Computational Assumption	Memory dependent	Efficiency	Unforgeability
MS10	No	No	Inefficient	Adaptive Unforgeability
JLS18	quantum secure one-way function	No	Efficient	Adaptive Unforgeability
AMR20	No	Yes	Efficient	Adaptive Unforgeability

Public Quantum Coins: No candidate construction.

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## OUR CONTRIBUTIONS


- *Almost* Public Quantum Money from standard assumption.
- Almost Public Quantum Coin construction.
- Other meaningful notions of security.
- Comparison-based Verification.



# OUR CONSTRUCTION



# COMPARISON-BASED VERIFICATION



## Observations

- Money states should be identical.
- Specific security features of the money not required.


# CHALLENGE IN QUANTUM SETTING

## How to compare two quantum states?

➤ Attempt: SWAP TEST? 

➤ Accepts product states with probability  $\geq \frac{1}{2}$ .

➤ 0 to 1 forging possible.



➤ Solution: Symmetric subspace projective measurement.

➤ Each coin is  $k$  mini coins/registers.

➤ Measurement projecting onto the Symmetric subspace of  $2k$  registers.

# OUR CONSTRUCTION

Public Quantum Coin


Private Quantum Coin

*Keygen, Mint, Verify*  
 $|\phi\rangle$

- *Keygen*: Same as *Keygen*
- *Mint*: Repeat *Mint*  $k$  times.  $|\phi\rangle = |\phi\rangle^{\otimes k}$
- *Verify*: Comparison-based verification.

**Symmetric subspace over  $m$  registers**  
 $Sym(\mathcal{H}^{\otimes m})$ :  $m$  register pure states  
invariant under any permutation of registers.

Symmetric subspace measurement






# SECURITY DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULTS





# UNFORGEABILITY GAME (INFORMAL)




Standard Unforgeability:  $\# \text{ successful verifications} \leq n$ .

Rational Unforgeability:  $\mathbf{E}(\# \text{ successful verifications}) \leq n$ .


Not worth  
the risk



# IS UNFORGEABILITY ENOUGH?




Unforgeability, Completeness



Security against Sabotage

# SABOTAGE GAME (INFORMAL)



Standard Security against Sabotage:  $Accept_1 \leq Accept_2$ .

With  
overwhelming  
probability

Rational Security against Sabotage:  $\mathbf{E}(Accept_1) \leq \mathbf{E}(Accept_2)$ .

## LIFTING RESULT

Unforgeable

Private Quantum  
Coin Scheme


MS10, JLS18, AMR20

Our  
construction

Rationally Secure  
Public Quantum Coins

## MAIN RESULT

One-Way Functions  
exist



Rationally Secure  
Public Quantum Coins

JLS18

Our  
construction



Rationally Secure  
Public Quantum Coins

Based on One-Way Functions

## OTHER RESULTS

Private Quantum  
Coin Scheme



Our  
construction

### Resulting Public Quantum Coin Construction

Private Coins Scheme	Memory dependent	Efficiency
MS10	No	Inefficient
AMR20	Yes	Efficient

# PROPERTIES OF OUR CONSTRUCTION

## Negatives

1. Rational Secure.
2. Fresh coin required for every received transaction.

## Positives

1. Real world adversaries are rational.
2. Need to visit the bank only once in a while.

Practically, no less than a public quantum coin scheme!



# TECHNICAL RESULTS

1.0 TO 1 UNFORGEABILITY

2.OPTIMAL  $n \rightarrow n + 1$  FORGERY






# 0 TO 1 UNFORGEABILITY

## Private coin

$$|\phi\rangle = |1\rangle \in \mathbb{C}^2$$

## Public coin

$$|\phi\rangle = |1\rangle^{\otimes k}$$



$$|\phi\rangle \approx |0\rangle^{\otimes k}$$

Verify

Unforgeability of private scheme

Hamming weight on measuring  $|\phi\rangle = 0$


Verify:

$$|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |0\rangle^{\otimes k}$$

$$|\phi\rangle$$

$$|\phi\rangle$$

$$\Pi_{Sym}, I - \Pi_{Sym}$$



$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\binom{2k}{k}}} \sum_{\substack{b \in \{0,1\}^{2k} \\ wt(b)=k}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^{2k} |b_i\rangle$$

Accept

$$Sym^\perp$$

Reject

Forgery probability


$$\frac{1}{\binom{2k}{k}}$$

Negligible!


# OPTIMAL FORGERY $n \rightarrow n + 1$

Public coin:

$$|\phi\rangle = |1\rangle^{\otimes k} \in \mathcal{H}^{\otimes k}$$



Hamming weight on  
measuring  $|\phi\rangle \leq nk$



Forgery probability

Maximize  $|\Pi_{Sym}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |\phi\rangle)|^2$

$|\phi\rangle$



## USING PROPERTIES OF SYMMETRIC SUBSPACE

$$|\phi\rangle \in \text{Sym}(\mathcal{H}^{\otimes (n+1)k})^\perp \Rightarrow \Pi_{\text{Sym}}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |\phi\rangle) = 0$$

Maximize  $|\phi\rangle$

Forging Probability

$$|\Pi_{\text{Sym}}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |\phi\rangle)|^2$$

Hamming weight on  
measuring  $|\phi\rangle \leq nk$

$$|\phi_{\text{opt}}\rangle \in \text{Sym}(\mathcal{H}^{\otimes (n+1)k})$$



# BASIS FOR SYMMETRIC SUBSPACE

$$Sym(\mathcal{H}^{\otimes m}) \quad \{|Sym_j\rangle\}_{0 \leq j \leq m} \quad |Sym_j\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\binom{m}{j}}} \sum_{\substack{b \in \{0,1\}^m \\ \text{wt}(b)=j}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^m |b_i\rangle$$

1. Hamming weight on measuring  $|Sym_j\rangle = j$ .
2.  $(\langle 1|^{\otimes k} \otimes \langle Sym_i|) \Pi_{Sym} (|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |Sym_j\rangle) = 0$ .
3.  $|\Pi_{Sym}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |Sym_j\rangle)|^2 = \frac{\binom{m}{j}}{\binom{m+k}{j+k}} \quad j$

# OPTIMAL FORGER $n \rightarrow n + 1$

$$|\phi_{opt}\rangle \in \{|\text{Sym}_j\rangle\}_{j \leq nk}$$



$$|\phi_{opt}\rangle = |\text{Sym}_{nk}\rangle$$

Maximize  $|\Pi_{\text{Sym}}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |\phi\rangle)|^2$   
 $|\phi\rangle$

➤ Hamming weight on measuring  $|\phi\rangle \leq nk$ .

➤  $|\phi\rangle \in \text{Sym}(\mathcal{H}^{\otimes (n+1)k})$ .

Optimal forgery probability

$$|\Pi_{\text{Sym}}(|1\rangle^{\otimes k} \otimes |\text{Sym}_{nk}\rangle)|^2 = \frac{\binom{(n+1)k}{nk}}{\binom{(n+2)k}{(n+1)k}} \approx \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^k \rightarrow 1$$

as  $n \rightarrow \infty$

Not Standard  
Unforgeable



# SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL RESULTS

- 0 to 1 Unforgeability.

- Optimal  $n$  to  $n + 1$  forgery.

- Our construction is standard forgeable. 

- Our construction is rational unforgeable. 

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## DISCUSSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

- Can comparison-based verification be useful – quantum copy-protection, quantum tokens for digital signatures, secure software leasing, etc?
- Does there exist (standard) unforgeable public quantum money scheme from standard assumptions?



Thank You