

# Perfect Value 3XOR Games


Based on work by **Adam Bene Watts, J. William Helton**

arXiv:2010.16290.


# Nonlocal Games




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
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
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
# XOR Games




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


# XOR Games



# XOR Games – Testing a linear system of equations


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
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Classical Value  $\omega$  (the maximum win probability achievable by classical players) is the maximum fraction of satisfiable clauses in associated system of equations.

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Entangled value  $\omega_{co}^*$  can be larger than the max fraction of (classically) satisfiable clauses.

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This talk: We can decide if a 3XOR game has perfect commuting operator value ( $\omega_{co}^* = 1$ ) in **polynomial time**. All 3XOR games with perfect commuting operator value have a perfect strategy where players share a **3 qubit GHZ state**.

# Groups

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If the game has  $\omega_{co}^* = 1$ , words in  $H$  correspond to products of operators (and -1) which fix  $|\psi\rangle$

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**Theorem 2.1.** *An XOR game is has commuting operator value  $\omega_{co}^* = 1$  iff  $\sigma \notin H$ , where  $\sigma, H$  are defined relative to the XOR game as described .*

  
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earlier in this talk

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Proof (Sketch):

**Only if:**  $\sigma \in H \Rightarrow \omega_{co} < 1$ .

Assume for contradiction that  $\sigma \in H$  and  $\omega_{co} = 1$ .

- Since  $\sigma \in H$  there exists a sequence of clauses  $h_{r_1} h_{r_2} \dots h_{r_t} = \sigma \in H$ .
- Since  $\omega_{co} = 1$  all clauses in  $H$  correspond to products of operators which fix  $|\psi\rangle$ .

Then  $|\psi\rangle = h_{r_1} h_{r_2} \dots h_{r_t} |\psi\rangle = \sigma |\psi\rangle = -|\psi\rangle$

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Proof (Sketch):

If:  $\sigma \notin H \Rightarrow \omega_{co} = 1$ .

Construct strategy observables  $X_i, Y_j, Z_k$  via representations of group elements  $x_i, y_j, z_k$ .

Representation is left action of group on (left) cosets of  $H$ .

$$|\psi\rangle = |H\rangle - |\sigma H\rangle$$

Check:  $\sigma|\psi\rangle = -|\psi\rangle, h|\psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle \forall h \in H$ .

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But  $H, \sigma$  has a lot of structure – we only care about specific instances of the subgroup membership problem.

Key Question: Are these instances decidable?

- For 2 players: YES (Tsirelson)
- For 3 players: YES (coming up)
- For >3 players: Completely open

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- If  $[\sigma]_k \notin H \text{ (mod } K) \Rightarrow \sigma \notin H$  so there exists a perfect commuting operator strategy ( $\omega_{co}^* = 1$ ) with operators satisfying the additional relations imposed by  $K$ .
- If  $[\sigma]_k \in H \text{ (mod } K)$  there is no perfect commuting operator strategy with operators satisfying the additional relations imposed by  $K$  (but we can't, in general, conclude anything about  $\omega_{co}^*$ ).

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**High-level overview:** Ask if there is a strategy where the strategy observables satisfy some additional constraint(s). Deciding if such a strategy exists can be **easier** than deciding if a general strategy exists.

# Examples

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**Ex 2 (important):**  $K = \gamma_2(G^E) = \left\langle \left\{ [x_i x_{i'}, y_j y_{j'}], [y_j y_{j'}, z_k z_{k'}], [z_k z_{k'}, x_i x_{i'}] \right\} \right\rangle^{G^E}$

- **Enforces that “Strategy observables commute in pairs.”**
- We use this  $K$  for the rest of the talk.
- Sneaky detail:  $K$  is not a normal subgroup of  $G$ . But it is a normal subgroup of  $G^E$  and we can switch to thinking about  $G^E$  (even length words) and  $H^E$  (even length sequences of clauses) without breaking anything.

# Some Theorems (Restatement of results from 1801.00821)

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**Theorem 2.2.** Let  $\sigma, H^E, K$  be defined relative to an XOR game as described [REDACTED]. Let  $[\sigma]_K$  be the coset containing  $\sigma$  after modding  $G^E$  out by  $K$ . Then we can check if  $[\sigma]_K \notin H^E \pmod{K}$  in polynomial time.

If we mod out by  $K$ , the subgroup membership problem for  $G$  becomes decidable.

# Some Theorems (Restatement of results from 1801.00821)

earlier.

**Theorem 2.2.** Let  $\sigma, H^E, K$  be defined relative to an XOR game as described [REDACTED]. Let  $[\sigma]_K$  be the coset containing  $\sigma$  after modding  $G^E$  out by  $K$ . Then we can check if  $[\sigma]_K \notin H^E \pmod{K}$  in polynomial time.

If we mod out by  $K$ , the subgroup membership problem for  $G$  becomes decidable.

**Theorem 2.4.** If a  $k$ XOR game corresponds to a subgroup  $H$  with  $[\sigma]_K \notin H^E \pmod{K}$  then the game has  $\omega_{co}^* = \omega_{tp}^* = 1$  with a perfect value MERP strategy. A description of this strategy can be found in polynomial time.

If there is a perfect commuting operator strategy satisfying the  $K$  relations, then there is a perfect tensor product strategy where the players share a 3 qubit GHZ state.

# Main Theorem 2

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For 3XOR Games



**Theorem 2.6.**  $\sigma$  is contained in  $H$  iff, after modding out by  $K$ , the coset containing  $\sigma$  is contained in  $H^E$ . That is:

$$\sigma \in H \iff [\sigma]_K \in H^E \pmod{K}.$$

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A 3XOR Game has a perfect commuting operator strategy iff it has a s

Putting everything together for 3XOR games:

$$\omega_{co}^* = 1 \Leftrightarrow \sigma \in H \Leftrightarrow [\sigma]_K \in H^E \Leftrightarrow \text{1 qubit tensor product strategy}$$

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**Proof:**

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**Proof:**

( $\Rightarrow$ ) Clear

( $\Leftarrow$ ) Involved!

# Intuition: Why K?

Given a system of equations like:

$$X_1 Y_1 Z_1 |\psi\rangle = X_1 Y_2 Z_2 |\psi\rangle = X_3 Y_3 Z_3 |\psi\rangle = X_4 Y_3 Z_4 |\psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle$$

Combine them to get:

$$\begin{aligned} X_1 X_1 Y_1 Y_2 Z_1 Z_2 |\psi\rangle &= Y_1 Y_2 Z_1 Z_2 |\psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle \\ X_3 X_4 Y_3 Y_3 Z_3 Z_4 |\psi\rangle &= X_3 X_4 Z_3 Z_4 |\psi\rangle = |\psi\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Then combine those to get:

$$\begin{aligned} (Y_1 Y_2 Z_1 Z_2) (X_3 X_4 Z_3 Z_4) (Y_1 Y_2 Z_1 Z_2)^{-1} (X_3 X_4 Z_3 Z_4)^{-1} |\psi\rangle \\ = (Z_1 Z_2) (Z_3 Z_4) (Z_1 Z_2)^{-1} (Z_3 Z_4)^{-1} = |\psi\rangle \end{aligned}$$

# Intuition: Why K?

⇒ Some elements of K naturally end up as fixing  $|\psi\rangle$ .

Modding out by K is restricting to a strategy where *all* elements of K fix  $|\psi\rangle$ .

You can get close to a proof that this works by repeating the previous slides construction to show lots of elements of K fix  $|\psi\rangle$ .

... but the full proof is a lot more work.

# (Some) Open Questions

Can we decide whether  $\omega_{co}^* = 1$  for k-XOR games with  $k > 3$ ? Mod p games?

- One possible approach – K modding with general K.

More generally, for what games (resp. what classes of correlations) is it easy to compute  $\omega_{co}^*$ ? What do the strategies optimizing the value of those games look like?

- It is known that we can compute the value of symmetric XOR games, 2 question XOR games, and 3 player XOR games. *In all cases the optimal strategy looks the same.*

Even if we can't compute the value, can we easily compute the restricted value achievable by observables satisfying some relations? Is this restricted value useful?

Thanks!